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THE ROLE OF DIGNITY IN CANADIAN AND
SOUTH AFRICAN GENDER EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE

ANDREW FOSTER†
This paper analyzes the use of dignity in the formation of tests for gender
equality in the constitutional jurisprudence of Canada and South Africa.
Recent gender equality cases in both countries are reviewed and considered
in light of various critiques of the notion that dignity is a concept capable
of underlying equality and determining instances of discrimination. A
comparison between Canadian and South African commentators reveals
many of the same concerns about a dignity-centered test for equality, concerns
which often transcend national boundaries apply with equal force to gender
equality cases in the other jurisdiction. While courts in both countries have
expressed a preference for a substantive as opposed to formal approach to
equality, and have focused on dignity in order to avoid entrenching preexisting disadvantage through uniform treatment, it is argued that too great
a focus on dignity has itself obscured considerations of group disadvantage
and contributed to the very formalism dignity was supposed to overcome.
Equating discrimination with violations of dignity has not furthered women’s
rights in either country, and has instead gone some way towards undermining
them, suggesting that courts in Canada and South Africa should move away
from dignity in formulating and applying a test for equality.

Andrew Foster is currently completing his LL.M (Master of Laws) in the Institute of
Comparative Law at McGill. His studies include comparative law, international law,
constitutional law, legal theory and property law. His Masters research deals with the use
of international law in constitutional rights interpretation.
†
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I. INTRODUCTION
A comparative review of equality and its constitutional protection scarcely
admits of a more striking similarity than the one between Canada and South
Africa, both in terms of statutory language and jurisprudence. Not only
are the equality provisions themselves largely textually comparable, but
courts in both countries have adopted a substantive approach to equality
which strongly associates – if not equates – equality with human dignity.
Such symmetry should not be surprising, given the strong influence the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 and its jurisprudence, has
had on South Africa’s Bill of Rights2 and Constitutional Court. What is
surprising, however, is the recurring charge that neither Court is applying
the doctrine of substantive equality with much consistency or positive
social effect.3 One reason for this may lie, somewhat paradoxically, in the
focus on dignity as the criterion used to define equality. That is, the use
of dignity as a normative standard for determining violations of equality
has itself reinforced the very formalism it was supposed to overcome.
While associating dignity with human rights, and equality in particular, has
had a long history, it has also come under increasing scrutiny and criticism
as a means by which equality claims may be coherently judged. This
paper will critically analyze the concept of dignity, to determine whether
the analysis of equality as dignity has been given too much importance
in recent equality jurisprudence. These criticisms will then be considered
in the specific context of gender equality, an area for which the charge of
inconsistency, and a return to formalism, is particularly apparent in Canada
and South Africa. I suggest that a dignity-centred approach to equality is
problematic for women as it shifts the focus from material disadvantage and
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982 c. 11 [Charter].
2
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996 (to
be distinguished from the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of
1993).
3
See, e.g., Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, “Ten Years of Transformation: How Has
Gender Equality in South Africa Fared?” (2002) 14 C.J.W.L. 255; Beverley Baines, “Using
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to Constitute Women” in Beverley Baines & Ruth
Rubio-Marin, eds. The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005) 48 at 72-74.
1
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group vulnerabilities, which were at the centre of earlier jurisprudence in
both countries, towards greater formalism. A review of the South African
gender equality decisions in President of the Republic of South Africa v.
Hugo4 and S. v. Jordan5 demonstrates the problems with this dignity-centred
approach. Furthermore, the recent Canadian gender equality decision in
Trociuk v. British Columbia6 produced an outcome that reveals, to anyone
interested in using substantive equality to transform gender relations, the
perils in applying the Canadian dignity-centred equality jurisprudence.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF EQUALITY
South Africa’s equality provision7	

    was	

    inﬂuenced	

    by	

    s.	

    15	

    of	

    the	

    Charter as
part of a larger trend of borrowing8	

    that	

    was	

    the	

    ﬁrst	

    step	

    towards	

    a	

    generally	

    
parallel	

    progression	

    of	

    the	

    two	

    countries’	

    equality	

    jurisprudence.	

    The	

    ﬁrst	

    
opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to consider equality under s.
15 of the Charter was in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,9 a case
which established the Court’s substantive, as opposed to formal, approach
to equality and its emphasis on disadvantage. Andrews dealt with a British
man who alleged that a section of the British Columbia Barristers and
Solicitors Act10 was discriminatory on the basis that it required lawyers to
be Canadian citizens. The Court agreed, looking at the effect of the law on
the applicant rather than its uniform application, it held that the imposition
of burdens on groups based on immutable personal characteristics (e.g.
place of birth) would almost inevitably amount to discrimination.11
[1997] 6 B. Const. L.R. 708 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Hugo].
[2002] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1117 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Jordan].
6
2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 [Trociuk].
7
S. 9 of the 1996 Constitution and s. 8 of the 1994 Interim Constitution.
8
See D.M. Davis, “Constitutional borrowing: The influence of legal culture and local
history in the reconstitution of comparative influence: The South African Experience”
(2003) 1 Int’l J. Constitutional L. 181 at 186-187, 191.
9
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [Andrews].
10
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 26, s. 42.
11
Supra note 9 ¶ 37.
4
5
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The method in Andrews of looking to whether a law fosters harm was taken
up again in R. v. Turpin,12 a case which suggested that the purpose of s. 15
was protecting disadvantaged groups since discrimination would, in most
cases, require that pre-existing disadvantage be established.13 In that case,
an Ontario resident had alleged that the crime he was charged with was
discriminatory because the option of choosing a judge over a jury was only
available in Alberta. The Court denied the claim on the basis that those
charged with the crime outside of Alberta do not constitute a historically
disadvantaged or vulnerable group.14 Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney
General)15 further reinforced the idea that equality is not synonymous with
equal treatment, as the Court focused on the disadvantaged position of
women compared to men and concluded that subjecting men and women
prisoners to different frisk searches did not constitute discrimination.
An action had been brought by a male prisoner who alleged that only
subjecting men to cross-gender searches constituted discrimination, but
the Court allowed for differential treatment on the grounds that historical,
biological and sociological differences made cross-gender frisk searches on
women more threatening.
A similar approach was taken in the early South African equality case
of Brink v. Kitshoff,16 where the Court chose a contextual and historical
approach and focused on equality as a means of overcoming harm and
social disadvantage. In Brink, a woman challenged a section of the
South African Insolvency Act17 that treated men and women differently
when it came to the maximum amount claimable on an insurance policy.
The section was struck down as being a relatively clear instance of
discrimination, though the decision is perhaps most noted for its contextual
approach and focus on pre-existing discrimination.18

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 [Turpin].
Ibid. ¶ 50.
Ibid. ¶ 52.
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 [Weatherall].
[1996] 6 B. Const. L.R. 752 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Brink].
Act 24 of 1936.
Jagwanth & Murray, supra note 3 at 279.
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The introduction in Canada of dignity into the analysis of equality did
not occur until Egan v. Canada (Attorney General).19 L’Heureux-Dubé J.,
in her dissenting judgment, held that human dignity was at the heart of
s. 15.20 The majority of the South African Constitutional Court in Hugo
were persuaded by this dignity centred approach, quoting21 the following
passage from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s judgment in their own:
Equality, as that concept is enshrined as a fundamental
human right within s. 15 of the Charter, means nothing
if it does not represent a commitment to recognizing
each person’s equal worth as a human being, regardless
of individual differences. Equality means that our society
cannot tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain
people as second-class citizens, that demean them, that
treat them as less capable for no good reason, or that
otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.22
The majority of the Court in Hugo concluded that the purpose of the
protection in the South African Constitution against discrimination lay
not in avoiding discrimination against disadvantaged groups, but in the
recognition that “all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.”23
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s conception of equality as the recognition that all human
beings are equally deserving of “concern, respect and consideration” soon
made its way into Canadian equality jurisprudence through the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration.)24 There the Court dealt with the question of whether
distinctions	

    based	

    on	

    age	

    with	

    regard	

    to	

    entitlement	

    of	

    survivor’s	

    beneﬁts	

    
under the Canada Pension Plan25 amounted to discrimination. A young
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [Egan].
Ibid. ¶ 36.
Hugo, supra note 4 ¶ 41.
Egan, supra note 19 ¶ 36.
Hugo, supra note 4 ¶ 41.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law].
1985, R.S.C., c. C-8, ss. 44(1)(d) [am. c. 30 (2nd Supp.), s. 13], 58(1)(a) [am. idem.,
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widow claimed that the scheme’s remittance of fewer benefits for those
under the age of 45 violated her right to equality, but the Court failed to
find such a violation.
Both Canada and South Africa currently employ a three-part test to
analyze equality issues derived from Law and the Constitutional Court
of South Africa’s decision in Harksen v. Lane No26 respectively. In both
countries the first part deals with distinctions. The Canadian claimant
must show that the law either draws a formal distinction with others
on the basis of personal characteristics, or fails to consider her already
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively
differential treatment. The South African claimant must only show some
differentiation, as a violation of s. 9(1) is established where the differentiation
cannot be rationally connected to a government purpose. Where a rational
connection does exist, the Court must proceed to s. 9(2) and determine
whether the differentiation amounts to unfair discrimination. The second
step is to determine whether the distinction or differentiation was made
on one of the grounds enumerated in the equality section, or a ground
deemed by the Court to be analogous. Although dignity plays a role in the
second part of both tests for unenumerated grounds, as discrimination
based on sex is an enumerated ground, it is the third part of each country’s
test that is of primary concern.
In Law, discrimination (or “unfair discrimination” as it would be
characterized in South African jurisprudence) is found where the differential
treatment imposes a burden or withholds a benefit in a way that “reflects
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics,
or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view
that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a
human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of
concern, respect, and consideration.”27 This issue is considered in light of
four factors: 1) pre-existing disadvantage, 2) correspondence between the
ground of the claim and actual need, 3) the ameliorative purpose of the
s. 26].
26
[1997] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1489 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) [Harksen].
27
Supra note 24 ¶ 88.
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law on disadvantaged persons, and 4) the nature and scope of the interest
affected.
In Harksen the Constitutional Court of South Africa considers similar
factors in determining unfair discrimination: (1) past discrimination, (2)
purpose of law, and (3) impairment of fundamental dignity. And while
dignity is compartmentalized as one factor to consider, courts have largely
equated unfair discrimination with the violation of fundamental human
dignity. For example, the Constitutional Court in Hoffmann v, South
African Airways28 noted that “dignity was impaired when a person is
unfairly discriminated against.”29 Relevant considerations for determining
unfair discrimination included the three stated in Harksen as well as an
additional consideration similar to that found in Law, namely the extent
of the affected interest. Ultimately, the Court in Hoffmann referred back
to Hugo and concluded that “[at] the heart of the prohibition of unfair
discrimination is the recognition that under our Constitution all human
beings, regardless of their position in society, must be accorded equal
dignity.”30
These equality tests from Law and Harksen have since been applied to
gender by both countries’ courts: in Trociuk in Canada and the cases of
Jordan and Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha31 in South Africa. At issue
in Trociuk was the validity of legislation allowing birth mothers not to
acknowledge the child’s father on birth registration. The Supreme Court
of Canada held that not allowing a father to have his particulars included
amounted to a violation of his dignity and thus ran contrary to s. 15 of
the Charter. The question of dignity was likewise at issue in Bhe, where
the South African Constitutional Court held that primogeniture rules in
customary laws of succession, which preclude women from inheriting
from anyone intestate, were in violation of s. 9 (right to equality) and s. 10
[2000] 11 B. Const. L.R. 1235 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Hoffmann].
Ibid. ¶ 27.
30
Ibid. See also Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, “Constitutional Claims for Gender Equality: A
Judicial Response” (2003) 67 Alb. L. Rev. 565.
31
[2005] 1 S. Afr. L.R. 580 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII) [Bhe].
28
29

80

Dignity in Gender Equality Jurisprudence

2008

(right to dignity).32 Finally, the Constitutional Court in Jordan considered,
in part, the constitutionality of a provision that criminalized commercial
prostitution but not the act of solicitation by the client. The majority in
Jordan held that there was no gender discrimination since the language was
couched in gender neutral terms, though the dissent took up the question
of whether dignity was infringed in both s. 9 and s. 10. These cases will be
discussed more fully in due course.

III. DIGNITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE EQUALITY TEST

Recent scholarship on the relationship between dignity and human rights
suggests that while the term dignity is itself of ancient origins, its connection
to equality has been a matter of historical progression. One of the first
references to the “dignity of man” or dignitas, has been attributed to Cicero,
who used the term in two senses. While dignity referred to “rank or worth”,
it was also universalized: dignity was said to reside in human nature and
nature gave reason to all human beings.33 Dignity was similarly defined
in Christian theology where it was both universal, in that all humans are
made in the image of God, and based on rank.34 The evolution towards
our present egalitarian conception of dignity did not occur until the
Enlightenment, when, in response to the French Revolution and Protestant
Reformation, hierarchy lost much of its ideological legitimacy and dignity
became grounded exclusively in natural rights and human reason.35 This
Indeed, the very fact that the South African Constitution includes a freestanding right
to dignity brings into question why dignity should form the basis of the right of equality
in particular.
33
Hubert Cancik, “‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks
on Cicero, De Officiis I, 105-107” in David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, eds. The Concept
of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002) 19 at
19-27.
34
Joern Eckert, “Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law” in Kretzmer & Klein,
ibid., 41 at 43-44.
35
Ibid. at 44-46.
32
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shift has been partly credited to Immanuel Kant,36 who proclaimed that
man is “obligated to acknowledge … the dignity of humanity in every
other man.”37 Human dignity is inherent in that it is an “intrinsic worth
that belongs equally to all human beings as such, constituted by certain
intrinsically valuable aspects of being human.”38
This narrative of intrinsic worth is thought to have been reinforced in
the 20th century by numerous international human rights instruments
as a response to the horrors of National Socialism and the Holocaust.39
And yet contemporary thinkers in this liberal tradition have themselves
offered different conceptions of how human dignity is to be understood in
relation to equality and treatment by the state. Charles Taylor, for example,
views the Kantian conception of dignity and its emphasis on autonomy as
unfortunate in that it mandates identical treatment and values individual
rights over collective rights.40 Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, associates
equality with equal dignity, suggesting that dignity need not mean equal
treatment.41 Distinguishing between the right to equal treatment (an equal
distribution of an opportunity, resource or burden) and the right to be
treated as an equal (to be treated with the same respect and concern as
anyone else), Dworkin asserts that the right to treatment as an equal will
not always entail a right to equal treatment.42 It is the right to be treated
with equal respect and concern that is fundamental for Dworkin, a view of
dignity and equality which is reminiscent of the language of judges in both
Canada and South Africa.
Ibid. at 46.
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. by M.J. Gregor (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1964) at 132.
38
Ibid.
39
Yehoshua Arieli, “On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the
Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and His Rights” in Kretzmer & Klein, supra note 33, 1 at
1-3. In particular, Arieli points to the Preamble of The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810
(1948).
40
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition: An Essay (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992) at 37-44 and 56-58.
41
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1977) at 226-27.
42
Ibid.
36
37
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The view that equality rights should be based on human dignity has met
with a good deal of criticism from legal commentators, based in part
on the question of whether dignity is too individualistic a term from
which to judge equality rights. Sheilah Martin notes, for example, that
“dignity belongs more to the realm of individual rights than to group
based historical disadvantage,”43 suggesting that it may be ill-equipped to
provide a substantive equality analysis. Substantive equality presupposes
pre-existing group disadvantages that must be recognized and overcome,
often by means of differential treatment, whereas dignity, one might argue,
presupposes a classical liberal view of individual autonomy and agency
antithetical to such group-based analysis.
A related critique is offered by Albertyn and Goldblatt,44 who argue that
the equation of equality with dignity has, in the South African context,
caused courts to ignore group disadvantage. They note that while the first
equality case, Brink, focused on disadvantage, there was a shift in Hugo
whereby Goldstone J.’s description of equality as “according equal dignity
and respect” reduced equality to dignity. This signalled a shift away from a
group-based understanding of material disadvantage such that by the time
equality was given a complete analysis in Harksen, disadvantage became
only one of three criteria to consider. The replacement of disadvantage
with dignity is said to amount to a return to a liberal and individualist
conception of equality, individual personality being emphasized over
issues of material systemic vulnerability. To illustrate this, Albertyn and
Goldblatt note the decision in Harksen. While O’Regan J., writing for the
minority, emphasized group disadvantage and vulnerability stemming
from marriage as an institution in South Africa, Goldstone J., writing for
the majority, was said to have lost sight of the infringement to equality as
a result of his focus on dignity.45

“Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev. 299
at 329.
44
See Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, “Facing the Challenge of Transformation:
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14
S.A.J.H.R. 248.
45
Ibid. at 258-9.
43
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Albertyn and Goldblatt have also suggested that the right to substantive
equality should be given a meaning independent of the value of dignity,
one based on the value of equality.46 This is based on the idea that equality
can be understood as two separate concepts, as a right and a value, and
so it is important to consider what values are to inform a right. Sophia
Moreau makes such a distinction when she argues that the concept of
dignity, while helpful for understanding why we value equality, cannot
provide an answer as to the substance of equal treatment. To treat dignity
as the test for equality is, in other words, to conflate the reason for
valuing something with the thing itself. She illustrates this by means of an
example from property law, noting that the value of freedom explains the
right to property and alienation, but we would not derive a test for when
someone has successfully alienated a piece of property by looking at the
value of freedom. Dignity is a value, and as one underlying all Charter
rights generally,47 it cannot be expected to be of particular assistance to
s. 15.48 Greschner makes the same point, noting that since human dignity
as a concept informs the entire Charter, equating equality with dignity
would not allow one to differentiate equality rights from other Charter
rights.49
A different approach is taken by Anton Fagan, who tries to eliminate
any connection between dignity and equality on the basis that the latter
is actually devoid of substantial or moral content.50 As a comparative
standard to be understood on the basis of either a partial infringement of
independent constitutional rights or constitutionally grounded principles,
Ibid. at 249.
Sophia Moreau, “The Promise of Law v. Canada” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 415.
48
The same criticism could be made in the South African context, where dignity is
considered to be the basis of all constitutional rights. See Arthur Chaskalson, “Human
Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 S.A.J.H.R. 193.
49
Donna Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J.
299.
50
It should be noted that many of those opposed to a dignity-centred approach to
equality acknowledge that some sort of normative standard is advantageous. For example,
Greschner, ibid., proposes a focus on the belonging of individuals in communities: courts
should draw on the history of anti-discrimination and the treatment of groups in society
to determine whether particular groups are being treated as second-class citizens.
46
47
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equality is analytically distinct from dignity as a concept in the sense that
the latter is not a component of the former.51
What these views share, however, is the idea that the concept of dignity,
whatever its value, is not analytically capable of determining what
equality is or when it has been infringed. That is, even those who admit
some connection between equality and dignity emphasize that dignity
is simply too broad a value to itself be capable of making any definitive
pronouncements on the content of equality as a right.
There are also a number of difficulties with respect to the indeterminacy
of the term dignity. In addition to calling the third part of the Law test
“vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants,”52 Peter Hogg has
noted several problems with the inclusion of dignity in the equality test.
Firstly, it reverts to the idea that only unfair or unreasonable distinctions
violate s. 15, which was rejected in Andrews, since distinctions that impair
dignity will largely be the same as unreasonable or unfair distinctions.
By incorporating s. 1 concerns (e.g. demonstrating a rational connection
between the impugned law and its objective) into s. 15, the onus on the
claimant becomes greater and courts will consequently find fewer s. 15
violations.53 This problem has been borne out in practice, as Réaume notes
that the vast majority of post-Law cases have used dignity to find that s. 15
has not been violated.54
A second concern of Hogg’s is that courts could use three of the four
contextual factors to reintroduce the relevancy test introduced by Gonthier
in Miron v. Trudel55 and applied by LaForest in Egan. The test, which holds
that a law will not violate equality as long as the legislative classification is
functionally relevant to the values underlying the legislation, is particularly
Anton Fagan, “Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right
Misunderstood” (1998) 14 S.A.J.H.R. 220.
52
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2001)
at 1014.
53
Ibid. at 1007-15.
54
Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 La. L. Rev. 645 at 670.
55
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
51
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problematic in that the underlying values need not themselves be in keeping
with equality values.56 The indeterminacy of the dignity test has also been
noted by Greschner, who is concerned that the judicial discretion involved
in applying the dignity standard means that discrimination will devolve to
more of an assertion than an argument.57 Davis has made a similar charge
in the South African context, stating that the Constitutional Court has
rendered the value of equality meaningless by giving dignity a content and
scope “to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the demands
of the judicial designer.”58 The statement was made amidst a critique of
Hugo, which Davis criticized for introducing the principle of dignity into
the equality analysis based on a dissenting opinion in Egan, a Canadian
decision, and without any definition of the term.
There have also been a number of legal commentators, however, who have
supported the close association of equality with dignity. Susie Cowen has
insisted that dignity is better suited to inform equality than the value of
equality itself. Given that equality is a comparative concept and dignity
a substantive one, only the latter can provide the kind of normative
conception of equality needed to overcome formalism.59 She also eschews
the idea that dignity is too individualistic a term by noting that dignity
has been foundational to international human rights, both individual
and collectivist in nature, and informs both civil and political as well as
economic and social rights.60
Arthur Chaskalson has also pointed to international human rights
documents61 as justifying the correlation between dignity, which is a
founding value of the South African Constitution,62 and rights generally in
South Africa. He also asserts a close link between dignity and equality on
Hogg, supra note 52 at 1007-15.
Supra note 49 at 312-13.
58
D.M. Davis, “Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence” (1999) 116 S.A.L.J. 398
at 413.
59
Susie Cowen, “Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?” (2001) 17
S.A.J.H.R. 34.
60
Ibid. at 50.
61
Supra note 48 at 196.
62
See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, supra note 2, s. 1.
56
57
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the grounds that it is required in order to overcome a purely formal meaning
of equality that would entrench rather than dismantle past discrimination.
Equality must include an equality of worth, says Chaskalson, and this
requires that everyone be treated with equal respect and concern, as
conceived by Ronald Dworkin.63
Errol Mendes likewise appeals to Dworkin to suggest that dignity
encompasses collective rights, concluding that “[t]he fact that all human
[sic] belong to the human collectivity gives them the inherent right to
human dignity”. This is because “[t]he core of human dignity … is the
ability of human kind to collectively understand compassion and collectively
understand the need for justice to remedy unnecessary suffering”, any one
individual not needing to be imbued with reason to possess dignity.64
Denise Réaume makes a similar argument for collectivity, arguing that
dignity refers to the capacity of a person to have a conception of the self
and the capacity to conceive of the good, both of which are engaged in
relationships with others.65
These remarks are not persuasive enough to counteract the critiques of dignity.
To say that the human characteristics which make up dignity are undertaken
in groups is not particularly helpful given that many individual rights are
undertaken with others (e.g. expression). In fact, Réaume explicitly links
dignity with autonomy, personal fulfilment and the exercise of capacities in
order to realize one’s dreams,66 highly individualistic language that denotes a
classical liberal conception of agency antithetical to substantive equality and
its focus on the treatment of disadvantaged groups.
References to Dworkin are perhaps more fruitful, given that his conception
of dignity offers greater nuance than the Kantian tradition and allows for
differential treatment. That said, understanding dignity as something
collectively attributable to humanity universally does not ipso facto entail a
Supra note 48 at 202-03.
Errol P. Mendes, “Taking Equality into the 21st Century: Establishing the Concept of
Equal Human Dignity” (2000) 12 N.J.C.L. 3.
65
Supra note 54 at 677.
66
Ibid. at 673.
63
64
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consideration of historical vulnerabilities or group disadvantage. The fact
that international human rights documents mention groups in relation
to dignity, for example, does not say anything about how these rights
will be conceived in practice. Article 26 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights67 has generally been read as mandating formal
equality by the Human Rights Committee. A good example of this is the
decision in Ballantyne v. Canada,68 where the Committee had to determine
whether a Quebec law banning all commercial signs in English constituted
discrimination. The Committee denied any Article 26 violation, but did so
on very narrow reasoning. Contrary to the applicants’ position that they,
as English speaking entrepreneurs, were put at a disadvantage relative to
their French counterparts, the Committee insisted that the applicants were
not discriminated against since French speakers were equally unable to
advertise in English. The decision treated English and French speakers in
an identical fashion rather than looking to the pre-existing disadvantages
of French speakers in Canada or the potentially negative effect of the law
on English businesses in Quebec. The question, therefore, is ultimately
not whether it is analytically possible to conceive of dignity in sufficiently
collective terms to engage in a substantive equality analysis, but whether
such an outcome will be likely. The use of dignity by courts will need to be
analyzed further in order to help make such a determination.

IV. APPLICATION TO GENDER AND CASE LAW

Apart from the suggestion that dignity makes equality violations more
difficult for the claimant to prove generally, any large-scale departure
from a focus on group disadvantage may be particularly problematic for
women. Such a shift increases the susceptibility of courts to slip back into
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, art. 26, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976,
accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR].
68
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a more formal analysis of equality, thereby ignoring pre-existing power
imbalances between men and women. When context is ignored and men
and women are treated in an identical fashion, the potential for using
constitutional rights as a mechanism of social change and greater equality
in women’s everyday social reality is diminished.
This problem will be particularly acute for women where legislation seeks
to grant women a certain privilege that men may question as an affront to
their dignity. The focus on dignity may also be particularly problematic in
the area of economic and social rights, as courts are often less inclined to
equate unequal divisions of property, welfare rights, and other economic
rights with dignity and self-worth. In South Africa, an example of this is
Harksen, where it was held that subjecting surviving solvent spouses to
onerous and invasive burdens not applied to others involved in the insolvent
estate did not amount to a violation of dignity. A Canadian example is
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),69 where a scheme providing only
one-third of welfare benefits to those under 30 years of age was held not
to be discriminatory. The dignity of young persons was not thought to
be infringed even though the scheme created an economic situation that
was a serious risk to the claimant’s basic subsistence. These cases reinforce
the critique that a focus on dignity obscures the actual burdens being
experienced, a problem that is particularly acute for women given ‘the
feminization of poverty’. The effects of a dignity-based test have also been
directly at play in a number of gender equality cases, including Jordan, Bhe
and Trociuk, which will be considered in turn.
Before considering gender cases that apply the current dignity focused
equality analysis, it is worth discussing the decision in Hugo, a highwater mark in the South African Constitutional Court’s focus on dignity.
At issue was the constitutionality of a presidential act which remitted the
prison sentences of certain mothers of children but not of fathers. Writing
one of the decisions for the majority, Goldstone J. held that while the act
was discriminatory, it did not violate s. 9 as unfair discrimination because
“it cannot be said that it fundamentally impaired their rights of dignity
69
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or sense of equal worth.”70 The dissent approached dignity differently,
Kriegler J. holding that dignity was violated on the basis of the gender
stereotypes that the law presupposed, namely that women were primary
caregivers. Dignity, says Kriegler, is about “seeking to protect the basic
choices [people] make about their own identities”, and generalizations
based on gender inequality and patriarchy “stunt the efforts of both men
and women to form their identities freely.”71 Mokgoro J.’s dissent provided
a similar rationale, though focusing exclusively on the infringement of
men’s dignity. Stereotypical assumptions about men’s aptitude at child
rearing is an infringement of their equality and dignity, Mokgoro J.
held, as it fails to recognize the equal worth of fathers that are actively
involved in their children’s lives and treats them as less capable parents.
The only written decision not to appeal to dignity was that of O’Regan
J., who, writing a concurring majority opinion, agreed with Goldstone J.
on the outcome but provided divergent reasons as to why equality had
not been violated. Noting that gender stereotypes do not themselves make
discrimination unfair, O’Regan J. held that unfairness requires looking at
the group being discriminated against and the effect of the discrimination:
the more vulnerable the group and the more invasive the discrimination,
the more likely it is that it will be unfair. The discriminatory harm here
was neither severe nor to a traditionally disadvantaged group, so no unfair
discrimination was thought to exist.72
The Hugo decision is odd in that while it emphasizes a strong connection
between equality and dignity, the case could have been decided entirely
without it. Indeed, it would have simplified matters immensely, given
that although five separate and largely divergent decisions were given,
O’Regan J.’s decision did not appeal to dignity yet still found that s. 9 had
not been violated. O’Regan J.’s focus on the harm and disadvantage of the
complainant group achieved the same end as the majority generally, which
was to allow differential treatment between men and women in instances
where a positive benefit is provided to women and, at the same time, men
are not unduly harmed. By contrast, both the majority decision written by
70
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Goldstone J. and the minority decision by Kriegler J. focus on dignity, but
there is disagreement as to whether the law infringed the complainants’
dignity. Kriegler J. tied dignity to choices about individual identity, while
Goldstone J. simply asserted that human dignity was not infringed at all.
This emphasizes the vagueness and indeterminacy of the term: it can be
used to come to any number of conclusions, as was noted by Davis, and
illustrates that the Court lacks any unified conception of what dignity
means. The decision reached in Hugo was positive for women in that it
granted a privilege that likely would have been withheld had the state been
forced to provide it to everyone. However, the focus on dignity by the South
African Constitutional Court remained problematic in that it minimized
any analysis of actual disadvantage, an issue which became more apparent
for women in the Jordan decision.
The majority decision in Jordan, written by Ngcobo J., concluded that a law
criminalizing sex workers but not their clients did not constitute gender
discrimination since it applied to “any person” and was thus facially gender
neutral.73 Ngcobo J. also held that there was no indirect discrimination on
the grounds that there is a qualitative difference between prostitutes and
clients: the former are in the business of prostitution whereas the latter
may not be repeat offenders. Since the purpose of the law is to outlaw
commercial sex, it made sense to target prostitutes.74 Conversely, the
dissenting judgment written by O’Regan J. and Sachs J. held that the law
caused indirect discrimination, the effect of the law being to discriminate
against women since the vast majority of prostitutes are female and the
vast majority of clients are male. As the law reinforced stereotypes and
assumptions about gender behaviour that had the “potential to impair
the fundamental human dignity and personhood of women,”75 the
discrimination was also held to be unfair and thus a violation of s. 9.
Going through the three factors from Harksen, the dissent concluded
that unfair discrimination had been made out since women prostitutes
are a vulnerable group that are negatively impacted by stereotypes and
criminalization. However, when it came to the right to dignity under s. 10,
73
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O’Regan and Sachs J. had a very different view of dignity. Here the female
prostitute was not stripped of her dignity by the law, and so s. 10 had not
been violated, any diminishment of dignity was the result of engaging in
prostitution itself and the commodification of the body that such work
entails.76
The majority decision in Jordan has been criticized for failing to apply a
substantive equality analysis, thereby failing to properly take into account
the reality of prostitution in South Africa.77 Treating dignity as a criterion
when analyzing equality effectively masks group disadvantage and the actual
burdens felt. Such a critique helps to account for the failure of the Court to
fully consider issues of social disadvantage in the context of prostitution.
For the majority to suggest that there is no indirect discrimination is, firstly,
to ignore the social reality of women as a disadvantaged group who are
disproportionately affected by the law. Secondly, it is to fall into an analysis
like the validity test from Egan that Hogg warns us about, a mistake which
occurs when a Court decides to read the contextual factors associated with
dignity in a in a manner that counters the equality claim. Here the Court
dismissed the claim to indirect discrimination by pointing to the objective
of the legislation (outlawing commercial sex), forgetting that legislation
can serve a rational purpose and still amount to unfair discrimination.78
Yet, the minority’s discussion of dignity is even more troubling. It is, first
of all, inconsistent, in that it applies dignity to contrary ends. Whereas the
law violated dignity through gender stereotyping, the right to dignity is
thought not to have been violated since it is the individual choice of women
to engage in prostitution that violates their dignity, not the system that in
some circumstances severely limits women’s capacity to make any other
choice. This equivocation suggests that the content or meaning of dignity
is unclear and susceptible to much political and normative manipulation.
Secondly, the analysis uses an understanding of agency that subverts the
claims of marginalized women while at the same time undermining the
Ibid. ¶ 74.
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very human rights tradition that dignity is said to inform. Meyerson
explains this by appealing to Dworkin’s understanding of what it means to
treat all individuals as being worthy of the same respect and concern in the
context of the state power to criminalize conduct. For Dworkin, violating
dignity is a matter of treating groups as less than full members of the human
community by translating external preferences into the law rather than
focusing on general public ends. Focusing on criminalizing prostitution
over solicitation constitutes just such a preference for Meyerson, who
concludes that the minority judgment in Jordan does not apply dignity in
keeping with Dworkin’s conception. The larger problem, however, is that
the Constitutional Court has applied Dworkin’s conception of dignity in
the past,79 suggesting that dignity is being applied selectively and contrary
to women’s interests.80
Moving to the Canadian context, the first post-Law decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada on gender equality was Trociuk, which, as
noted, unanimously held that legislation allowing birth mothers not to
acknowledge the biological father on birth registration violated s. 15.
Applying the third part of the Law test, the Court began by holding
that the interests affected were important. Parents have a significant
interest in meaningfully participating in the lives of their children and
the inclusion of one’s particulars on a birth registration is “an important
means of participating in the life of a child.”81 Next, the Court held that
the distinction had a strong negative effect on the dignity of fathers. While
admitting that Law considered historical disadvantage to be “probably the
most compelling factor favouring a conclusion that differential treatment
imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory,”82 and that fathers did not
constitute a historically disadvantaged group, the Court concluded that “it
does not follow that the absence of historical disadvantage is a compelling
factor against a finding of discrimination.”83 It is unclear how this follows
See S. v. Makwanyane [1995] 6 B. Const. L.R. 665 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.) (SAFLII). In this
case, the Constitutional Court held that the death penalty was a violation of the right to
life as well as the right to dignity: see paras. 83-84, 144.
80
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given that, while discrimination can exist absent its most compelling
indicia, surely such an indicium in favour of discrimination would, in its
absence, at least be a compelling indicium against discrimination. Instead,
the Court noted that a reasonable father would perceive the legislature
as “sending a message that a father’s relationship with his children is less
worthy of respect than that between a mother and her children”, “a negative
judgment of his worth as a human being.”84 Moreover, equating fathers who
want to create a symbolic tie with their children with those who do not
was said to create false and pejorative associations similar to stereotypes
or prejudices. While there may be compelling reasons for permitting a
mother not to acknowledge a father at birth, the Court did not think these
reasons could justify the possible disadvantages that a father may face.85
Finally, the Court considered proposed ameliorative purposes or effects
of the legislation on more disadvantaged groups, namely women and
children. The Court acknowledged that the legislation encourages mothers
to report the birth, providing the certainty of non-disclosure for those
mothers who have valid reasons for not acknowledging the father. Yet the
Court concluded that, even where a legislative distinction serves a relevant
ameliorative purpose, the reasonable claimant may still perceive that his
dignity has been infringed.86
Trociuk exemplifies many of the worries expressed by critics about the
potential problems with dignity. While the Court goes through the various
considerations from Law, each criterion is read explicitly through the lens
of dignity in a way which minimizes the actual disadvantage of women
qua mothers and the potential burdens they face. It in fact does make
sense to treat women and men differently in the context of child birth
since the biological mother necessarily bears a burden that the biological
father, insofar as he is compared simply as the biological father and not as
a potential contributor to the child’s upbringing, does not. Whereas the
mother has a relationship with the child in virtue of the pregnancy itself, a
biological father need not have any connection with the child apart from
his genetic contribution. And yet the Court’s approach resembles a pure
84
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“same treatment” or formal equality analysis wherein mothers and fathers
are decontextualized as parallel contributors of genetic material such that
sex discrimination exists to the extent that they are treated differently.87 The
fact that males are not a vulnerable or disadvantaged group is effectively
ignored, while the valid reasons a mother may have for not wanting a
father on the birth certificate are downplayed.
The analysis in Trociuk also illustrates the malleability of “dignity”: just
as it is by no means apparent how including a father’s name on a birth
certificate constitutes “meaningful participation” in the child’s life, it is
equally unclear on what basis its exclusion would amount to “a negative
judgment of his worth as a human being”. The concept of dignity is used
to justify an outcome that it could just as easily have opposed. That is, one
could likewise envision the Court holding that the inclusion of information
on a birth registration has nothing whatsoever to do with dignity, or, what
is more, that requiring such an inclusion would infringe the dignity of
the mother. The decision in Trociuk would have almost certainly been the
opposite had the Court been forced to use the earlier test as outlined in
Andrews and elucidated in Weatherall and Turpin. These latter cases allow
differential treatment while all but ensuring that discrimination will not
be found absent pre-existing disadvantage, respectively, and biological
fathers do not constitute a vulnerable or insular minority. Given that
the differential treatment in Trociuk would not violate equality where
discrimination is largely equated with harming disadvantaged groups, the
fact that s. 15 is violated under the Law test reinforces the view of Albertyn
and Goldblatt that a dignity-focused test emphasizes individual personality
rights at the expense of remedying group disadvantage.
A review of these gender equality cases from Canada and South Africa
suggests that a dignity-centred approach to equality has gone some way
in undermining the very substantive equality that these countries’ Courts
have championed. While Hugo applied the kind of contextual analysis
William Black & Lynn Smith, “The Equality Rights” in Gérald-A. Beaudoin & Errol
Mendes, eds., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, 4th ed. (Markham: Butterworths,
2005) 927 at 983-984.
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befitting substantive equality, the same result could have been reached by
replacing dignity with the analysis provided in Turpin as male prisoners
are not an historically disadvantaged group. Jordan constitutes a far larger
problem for gender equality since the decision’s reliance on dignity is at
least partly to blame for its contradictory interpretations and minimization
of the actual conditions of women in South Africa. Yet Trociuk is arguably
an even more problematic decision for gender equality and the goal of
transcending formal equality. Not only did it fail to sufficiently address
the female perspective, thereby regressing into an equal treatment view of
equality, but it highlighted the disturbing flexibility with which the term
dignity can be used by judges.
It is by no means obvious how the exclusion of a name on a birth certificate
infringes dignity, while forcing young people to live on one-third of
subsistence wages, a consequence of the law at issue in Gosselin, does not.
Nor is it any more obvious why the exclusion is a greater offence to dignity
than the de facto focus on criminalizing only women in the sex trade,
as illustrated in the Jordan decision. Given that the women’s movement
has emphasized the need to provide clear language for rights in order to
avoid political and judicial appropriation,88 such divergent applications of
the term should be troubling. If Trociuk ultimately amounts to the kind
of analysis that results from a focus on dignity, then in a country like
South Africa, where there is likewise great interest among many in using
substantive equality to transform gender relations, there should be some
wariness in equating equality with dignity.
The recent South African decision in Bhe may at first glance be viewed
as an example of dignity being applied more favourably to women and
substantive equality generally, though a closer look suggests that some
qualification to that initial optimism is warranted. In that case, the
Constitutional Court found that primogeniture rules in customary laws
precluding women from inheriting intestate property violated equality,
See, e.g., Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Marin, “Introduction: Toward a Feminist
Constitutional Agenda” in Baines & Rubio-Marin, supra note 3, 1 at 9; Horia Mosadiq,
“The New Afghan Constitution: How Women Succeeded in Ensuring Certain Rights and
What Challenges Remain” (2005) 3 Critical Half 28 at 30-31.
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but did so without appealing to dignity. Instead, the Court simply noted
that the rules entrenched past patterns of disadvantage among a vulnerable
group.89 Dignity was said to have been violated, though only in respect of
the right to dignity under s. 10. The Court concluded that the implication
that women were not fit to own property was an affront to dignity90 in
addition to equality. In other words, the Court restricted its discussion of
dignity to the s. 10 right to dignity itself, avoiding the application of dignity
to different ends that created such inconsistency in Jordan. So while the
decision is certainly a victory for women’s rights, it should not be taken
as validation for the predominant view in South Africa’s jurisprudence
to date of associating equality with dignity. Moreover, the facts in Bhe
presented a fairly stark instance of unfair discrimination that no doubt
would have been found regardless of whether the Court applied dignity
to its equality analysis or not. Part of the problem with dignity is that it
can be applied to suit any end in more difficult factual scenarios, Hugo
being a notable example. Nonetheless, it is heartening to see the Court
in Bhe associate dignity with issues of socio-economics in a way that was
lacking in Harksen (to say nothing of Gosselin, in the Canadian context),
a move which suggests that South Africa’s Constitutional Court – though
more sympathetic to positive rights than its Canadian counterpart91 - may
be taking substantive equality more seriously than the Supreme Court of
Canada.
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V. CONCLUSION
A review of the jurisprudence in Canada and South Africa suggests that the
association of equality with dignity has not been advantageous for women.
Such a conclusion is counter-intuitive – if not downright troubling – given both
the desire for substantive equality by proponents of dignity, and the seemingly
positive effect that dignity, or at least an equality test which incorporates the
concept of dignity, has had for other disadvantaged groups (homosexuals in
Canada and blacks in South Africa).92 And yet the critiques of a dignity centred
test for equality have proven particularly prescient to issues of gender equality,
courts in both countries shifting from substantive to formal equality in the case
of women. Moreover, criticisms from Canadian legal commentators appear
equally relevant to the jurisprudence in South Africa, and vice versa. For
example, Hogg’s critique applies to the Jordan decision just as Albertyn and
Goldblatt’s critique applies to the Trociuk decision, suggesting that problems
with dignity are more inherent than the result of idiosyncrasies of a few
specific judges. Moving away from dignity may appear difficult to square with
a commitment to substantive equality and social transformation, particularly
for a country like South Africa, whose history of apartheid almost cries out
for its affirmation. And yet, recent Canadian jurisprudence affirms Moreau’s
view that while dignity can tell us why we value equality, it cannot determine
when it has been violated, something South African Courts would do well to
consider before looking to the Canadian perspective for guidance.

To say that a dignity-centred test has provided some benefits for one social group
or another is not necessarily to conclude that the concept of dignity is itself the ideal
standard with which to determine discrimination. A law or legal framework may be so
overtly discriminatory that an equality violation can and should be found even where preexisting disadvantage is not at the forefront of analysis.
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